This paper aims to answer two research questions: First, what are the sources of weaknesses found in current CSO-government relationships? Second, how could these weaknesses be remedied to bring better efficiency in social development assistance programs? Applying the Complexity Science framework and Brinkerhoff's related theoretical model to the field of social finance for the first time to the best of the authors' knowledge, this article argues that the implementation of social finance, generally, and social impact bonds (SIBs), specifically, can combine to create "smart social capital"-a new model in which trust is furthered and arguably maximized between relevant public and/or private sector networks in the form of stakeholders, through the efficient combination of shared interests in the form of financial as well as societal beneficial gains by related stakeholders and the community at large.
Former visiting scholar at Harvard University. Licensed U.S. attorney (Washington, D.C.). Worked previously on structured finance bond products with the investment banks of Lehman Brothers, Barclays Capital, and Credit Suisse. There are noticeable obstacles in working together, identified by both CSOs and governments, which undercut the effectiveness of development programs and result in an overall lack of efficiency in public sector initiatives.
Given these challenges, this paper aims to answer two related research questions:
First, what are the sources of weaknesses found in current CSO-government relationships? Second, how could these weaknesses be remedied to bring better efficiency in social development assistance programs? In response to such research questions, this paper argues that the implementation of social finance, generally, and social impact bonds (SIBs), specifically, can combine to create "smart social (Gidron and Kramer and Salamon, 1992) . Studies have found the strategic interests and power that sustain the relationship (Lister, 2000) and the level of interdependence and diversity among CSOs and governments that work closely together (Brinkerhoff 2002; Coston 1998) . Such works have largely been confined to patterns and solutions found within the public sector.
Thispaper, however, draws upon recent concepts established and expanded in the private sector during the post-subprime crisis era. It thus modestly suggests an incentive-based NGO-government partnership, through which to overcome
